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I. The Short and the Longer View
1. The public policy debate tends to be dominated by short-run considerations.
This holds for Keynesian economists and for policy makers in general. Both tend
to have a time horizon not extending beyond a two- or three-year period. In fo-
cussing on the short-run they are likely to overlook the fundamentals below the
surface. These fundamentals, I suggest, are more relevant than is usually as-
sumed. They relate to the real sector and hence to markets which are slow to ad-
just. Adherents of the rational expectations school suffer from a similar bias. They
stress the absorption and processing of new information and thus tend to see an
economy with short-run equilibria. This makes them pay less attention to the oper-
ation of market forces which are sluggish and tied to past plans and decisions,
rational or not, many of which can be corrected only gradually in the course of
time. But time lags and boomerang effects do matter. What is treated as an exo-
genous "shock" in a rational expectations model is in a longer perspective often
the more relevant part of economic life that has to be explained. Monetarists, it is
true, have a longer time horizon when it comes to judging the Phillips curve and
the effects of alternative monetary regimes, but their approach leads them to
neglect institutional rigidities, including labour market problems. It is here that
the supply siders have a role to play, but only if they go beyond the tax issue to
encompass the whole supply side in the spirit of classical economics.
2. It is the purpose of this paper to correct some of these shortcomings and to
lengthen the time horizon in the public debate about exchange rates, notably about
the dollar/DM rate. Long-term interest rates, most of all the real rate of interest
and the profitability of investment, will be brought into focus. The hypothesis
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notably to R. Fiirstenberg, H. Schmieding, F. Weiss.emerging from this paper is that the dollar is likely to remain strong for funda-
mental reasons, i.e. for reasons rooted in the real sectors of the American and
European economies. Temporary declines for short-term reasons are, of course, not
excluded. They should, therefore, not be viewed as disproving the central thesis:
what matters in the longer run are the vitality of an economy and its place and
role in world economic development.
3. The longer run is to be understood as comprising more than one decade and at
least one turning point in what Schumpeter called a "Kondratieff Cycle". This
widening of the time horizon brings to mind that the real exchange rate between
the dollar and the DM, i.e. the exchange rate adjusted for relative inflation, is
now (end of July 1984) close to what it was in the 1950s, when most people
thought it to be in equilibrium. To be sure, the U.S. and the Europe of today are
not the same they were thirty years ago. But such historical comparisons may still
serve as a useful background for forming a broad judgement about the present and
the future.
4. In a shorter perspective, i.e. in comparison to the mid-1970s, the dollar
appears to be grossly overvalued and U.S. interest rates look exotic. Within a
Keynesian framework of thought both can be seen as the result of a large U.S.
budget deficit which the Fed is unwilling to finance [Marris, 1984; Blanchard,
Dornbusch, 1984], Monetary and fiscal policy are seen to work against each other
in the U.S., and the overindebted countries have to carry the double burden of
high interest rates and an expensive dollar. If only the U.S. government could be
induced to sharply reduce its deficit by raising some taxes or by reversing a pre-
vious income tax cut, both the dollar and real interest rates in the world would
fall and find an acceptable equilibrium level [Bergsten, 1982]. This is the view
prevailing in the international economic policy discussion.
5. A dramatic picture presents itself when cyclical forces are brought to the fore-
ground in this Keynesian framework. The strength of the U.S. upswing which de-
veloped in 1983 despite high interest rates is then seen to be the result of deficit
spending [Marris, 1984], Much of the investment appears to be of the induced
type (described by the acceleration principle), just as the capital imports which
the U.S. needs in order to finance the current account deficit. These induced
capital imports support the exchange rate of the dollar. Sooner or later the
present business cycle will collapse, perhaps in 1985. Then the world will expe-rience both a sharp decline of U.S. interest rates and a downfall of the dollar
below its equilibrium level causing disruptions and new imbalances in the world
economy. So this story goes. But it may well be that in the U.S. the fundamental
conditions for investment and growth and hence for a strong dollar have improved
relative to the fundamentals in Europe so that the dollar can remain strong
irrespective of cyclical forces.
6. Monetarists usually take a longer view than politicians and Keynesians. Their
assertion that an exchange rate is the relative price of two monies appears trivial
at first glance, but their insistence on the quantity theory of money and its impli-
cations for the monies
1 domestic purchasing power certainly extends the time
horizon. Moreover, they stress the real component in nominal interest rates and
would, therefore, also join this paper's train of thought towards (changes in) real
exchange rates. The bridge to the fundamentals is the concept of confidence in the
long-run stability of the currency's domestic purchasing power. How a shift of
confidence from one currency to another leads to currency substitution and thus
changes the real exchange rate shall be considered below (para 28).
7. In a monetarist perspective budget deficits are likely to destroy confidence. As
Latin American experience - and earlier European experience - amply shows budget
deficits are often the result of fiscal irresponsibility; they can induce central
banks to pursue an inflationary policy designed to finance the deficits and to re-
duce the real value of the outstanding public debt. But this is not what has
happened so far in North America and present-day Western Europe. If markets
were suspicious in this respect the dollar would be weak rather than strong.
8. Financial analysts watching day to day developments relate the strong dollar to
high U.S. interest rates which they as well as monetarists [Mascaro, Meltzer,
1983] partly attribute to the volatility of Fed policy. But doubts come to mind
immediately: would a less volatile Fed policy weaken the dollar? The answer will, of
course, be "no" on monetarist grounds. We come closer to the fundamentals when
we raise the question how the U.S. economy can afford to pay the risk premium
for this volatility given the fact that its real sector is prospering and obviously
has fully adjusted to present interest rate levels. The answer is to be found in a
correspondingly high profitability (or marginal efficiency), of investment which can
be due either to the cut in business taxes or to technological innovation or to the
downward flexibility of real wages in the U.S. labour market. In an interdependentsystem it is, of course, difficult to single out any one of these factors. But it is
significant that they all belong to the real sector and explain why the latter is
vital enough to support a strong dollar.
II. Purchasing Power Parity
9. Those who say that the dollar is overvalued have, of course, an implicit norm
of what its exchange rate would be in normal circumstances or ought to be on ef-
ficiency grounds. Sometimes they implicitly or explicitly use a reference period or
entertain the idea that the dollar will settle on a level in the middle between the
high value it has achieved in 1984 and its trough in 1978. All this boils down to
the question of what fundamentals really determine the external value of a cur-
rency in the medium run.
10. The appropriate starting point is the purchasing power parity (PPP) doctrine
which is based on the law of one price. This law holds for tradables between any
two countries if trade is not restricted and if tariffs and taxes, transportation and
transaction costs are low enough to be ignored.
11. Deviations from this norm arise because the basket which is used to measure
the purchasing power in the countries to be compared not only includes standard-
ised commodities for which the law of one price may be taken to hold but also
goods and services which do not enter trade at all. We call them local goods or
non-tradables. If the relation between the prices of tradables and the prices of
non-tradables develops differently in the countries concerned we will find that the
exchange rate (which makes the price of tradables equal) deviates from PPP.
These are long-run deviations. We can observe them in international comparisons
between more developed countries and less developed countries and we think that
they are also likely to play a role in a process of catching up or lagging behind.
The major points and cases will be spelled out below.
12. Before doing so we propose to focus on a range of goods which are neither
purely local goods (like the service of land in housing rents) nor standardised
commodities to which the law of one price applies fairly well. These goods - callthem manufactures - are not sold in perfect markets but under conditions of mono-
polistic competition. They include such specific items as custom-tailored capital
goods, consumer goods fulfilling country-specific tastes, and new products which
can earn a monopoly rent, but must create their own markets first. Although these
manufactures - and a great number of quite specific services - are tradables they
are not strictly subject to the law of one price. Together with tradables and non-
tradables they form part of the PPP basket.
III. Temporary Deviations from PPP
13. Changes in the price of these manufactures relative to the price of standard-
ised commodities can lead to a deviation from PPP provided there is no compensa-
ting change in the relative price of non-tradables. Ignoring non-tradables for the
moment we can say that changes in the price of manufactures relative to the price
of standardised commodities matter in our context if they affect the terms of trade.
This is the case in the following examples.
14. A country removing restrictions on its foreign trade in manufactures must at
least temporarily lower the price of its exports in order to squeeze itself as an
aggressive seller into tight world markets; perhaps it also has to pay more for the
import of intermediate goods. This deterioration of the terms of trade goes along
with a devaluation of its currency in real terms. This benefits the export sector
and the import substitution sector at the expense of the domestic sector: the latter
shrinks relative to the international sector. Let me call this the case of an export
drive. It applied to West Germany in the early 1950s.
15. The export drive is, of course, facilitated if the exchange rates are fixed to
begin with and if they happen to be fixed in such a way that the country can run
an export surplus and the central bank can accumulate the other country's curren-
cy. This was relevant for Europe and for much of the Western World during the
period of the so-called "dollar shortage". While the process of dollar accumulation
gradually achieved its purpose the downward deviation from PPP ought to have
been corrected gradually to avoid an overshooting. But as we are fairly sure to
know, such overshooting did take place. A dollar overhang developed which againled to a rather drastic reversal of the real exchange rate at the time when the
Bretton Woods System broke down. An overshooting in the reverse direction - an
excessive devaluation of the dollar as it happened in the 1970s - was perhaps nec-
essary for shifting resources in Europe from the export sector to the domestic
sector and in the U.S. from the domestic sector to the export sector. The U.S.
had to become a relatively cheap country for Europeans, Europe a relatively ex-
pensive country for tourists from America. "Relative" here means compared to PPP,
but even more so in comparison to the period when Europe responded to the so-
called dollar shortage.
16. Another deviation from PPP equilibrium which is also connected with the terms
of trade takes place when a country, instead of squeezing itself into export mar-
kets, finds its export mix of manufactured products faced with a high income
elasticity of demand and uses this demand pull for expanding its export volumes
instead of raising prices. The international sector grows at the expense of the
domestic sector. The terms of trade are worse than they could be. Sooner or later
the country will - like West Germany at the end of the 1960s - discover that it has
an oversized export sector. An adjustment process will gather momentum either in
the form of a domestic cost push - higher wages and costs at the given exchange
rate - or in the form of a currency revaluation at constant prices. This adjustment
process amounts to an improvement in the country's terms of trade. All rents from
superior design and quality, from reliability and punctuality which were formerly
used for promoting volumes will then be collected in the form of higher export
prices. This improvement in the terms of trade goes along with an upward devi-
ation from the previous real exchange rate, most likely also with an overshooting
compared to long-run PPP.
17. Furthermore, changes in the terms of trade which involve a deviation from PPP
and, thus, have an effect on the real exchange rate will have to be brought about
to accomodate capital movements which are exogenous to the economic system. One
case involves reparation payments under conditions of full employment. Their
transfer in real terms requires a shift of resources from the domestic sector to the
export sector and hence a real devaluation of the country's currency so that the
export sector and the import substitution sector find their terms of trade vis-a-vis
the domestic sector improved.
18. A parallel case is that of a country that has lived on capital imports and has
run into excessive debt. In order to regain confidence in its viability and to im-prove its standing in international capital markets it must shift resources from the
oversized domestic sector to the export (and import substitution) sector and thus
improve its balance on current account. A real devaluation of the exchange rate,
involving a worsening of its international terms of trade, is necessary in such a
case to remedy an otherwise hopeless situation.
19. The last case refers to a country which insulates itself from cyclical fluc-
tuations in international demand. In a worldwide recession, a firm can maintain its
sales by undercutting its competitors' prices. A country full of such firms in its
export and import substitution sectors, supported by downward flexibility of
wages, could maintain a high level of employment by exhibiting such price flexi-
bility. Its trade balance on current account will then improve, its terms of trade
become worse. In comparison to PPP and the situation before the recession the
exchange rate will be considered undervalued. A good substitute for this is a
devaluation. Although some observers will call this a beggar-thy-neighbour policy,
the strategy is perfectly defensible if the recession has its origin abroad. No valid
objection on cosmopolitical grounds can be raised against it. Clearly, if every
country behaved in the same way without delay the real quantity of money in the
world (or the price of gold under a gold standard) would go up, and the Haber-
ler-Pigou-Effect would come into play. In the case of such a simultaneous action
temporary deviation from PPP would, of course, be observable. The preceding
argument applies symmetrically to the case of a country insulating itself from a
worldwide boom [Giersch, 1970],
IV. Sustained Deviations from PPP
20. We so far used the notion of PPP in a fairly loose fashion by concentrating on
manufactures and standardised commodities and leaving local goods and their prices
out of the picture. It is now time to shift the emphasis. In the long run there is
no reason to believe that the prices of manufactures will behave differently from
the prices of standardised commodities. Market imperfections and processes of the
kind described fade into the background, and the relative size of the domestic and
the international sectors can be taken to be in equilibrium. This means that the
rewards for capital and labour are the same across sectors within the country.21. But this intersectoral equalisation of factor rewards does not exclude intersec-
toral productivity differentials. Indeed they become important for explaining per-
manent deviations from PPP. They matter in inter-country comparisons if - but
only if - they are different in°the countries to be compared. In order to bring
this into sharp focus we consider only local goods which are not traded at all and
international goods (traded goods) for which the law of one price holds. The main
proposition here is that the production of tradables is subject to the productivity
whip of competition (or what Samuelson [1984] calls a "Darwinian-Toynbeean chal-
lenge process") whereas local goods are produced behind the shelter of transpor-
tation costs and hence with much slack (x-inefficiency) or with an inferior tech-
nology.
22. There is no reason to expect greatly different productivity differentials be-
tween countries that have attained similar levels of overall productivity and devel-
opment. Nevertheless, there are always exceptions. Thus we observe that some
local goods in Europe and some services that are more strictly regulated on the old
continent (e.g. air transportation, trucking, postal services) are distinctly more
expensive in comparison to internationally traded goods than they are in the much
larger markets of the New World. If the E.C. would deregulate and form a really
common market, Europe would be even cheaper for U.S. visitors than it is now.
23. As a general rule, however, poorer countries should be cheaper in PPP terms
than richer countries, just as poorer regions or cities in the same country tend to
have a lower cost of living level than rich regions or cities, where the costs of
local goods and services are boosted by the scarcity element in housing rents,
unless these non-tradables are produced with a correspondingly high productivity.
The rule of rich countries being expensive countries holds to the extent (a) that
local goods have significant weight in the PPP basket, and (b) that in the course
of the development process productivity in the international sector rises more than
in the local sector. The second condition is essential. The proposition has been
formulated by Balassa [1964], although somewhat differently, and can be traced
back to Harrod [1933] and - with some modifications - even to Ricardo [1817] (1).
(1) "Since gold rewards are proportional to efficiency in the output of tradable
goods, highly efficient countries may find the gold cost of providing their
...services, in which proportional economies cannot be made, higher than in
the less efficient countries. . .The efficient countries will therefore tend to have
a high cost of living" [Harrod, 1933, pp. 68 f ]. And Ricardo notes: "...the
prices of home commodities, and those of great bulk, though of comparativelyAs indicated it can be supported by the presumption that competition is a pro-
ductivity whip that operates more forcefully in the international sector than in the
sector producing local goods.
24. As a corollary, countries in a catching-up process, i.e. countries becoming
richer relative to their trading partners, will have an exchange rate which - al-
though still undervalued in absolute PPP terms until they have fully succeeded in
catching up - is becoming less and less undervalued. Compared to the past, the
catching-up country will experience an upward revaluation in PPP terms. Some
observers using the past as a norm may even (wrongly) interpret it as an over-
valuation. The process bringing this about not only includes competition that
raises productivity in the international sector more than in the local sector, but
also the technology transfer from the more advanced countries. This presumably
also affects the international sector more strongly or earlier. Apart from the tech-
nology transfer, the catching-up country is likely to benefit from capital imports.
This again will primarily affect its international sector, not so much - or only with
a time lag - its domestic sector. Capital imports, of course, mean a deficit in the
external balance on current account, and those who (wrongly) judge the exchange
rate with the norm of a current account equilibrium will see a strong (perhaps
additional) reason to say that it is overvalued.
25. When the German Expert Council in 1964 passed its first judgement on the
DM/dollar exchange rate, the dominant view in the public was that the (fixed) rate
still was what it ought to be. This is why the Expert Council, considering the
catching-up process and its effect on PPP, said that the Federal Republic, which
had been a cheap country (in PPP terms) at the beginning of the catching-up pro-
cess, should have ceased to be one. The exchange rate, therefore, was to be
judged as undervalued and a revaluation (or an upward float) was to be put on
the policy agenda [S.R., 1964/65]. But none of us at the time thought that the
revaluation required for these reasons would be more than 5-10 per cent. There is
no reason to question this judgement in retrospect. As the real exchange rate of
the dollar against the DM is now (July 1984) about 5 per cent higher than it was
in 1964, the dollar on these (partial) grounds appears to be overvalued by 10-15
small value, are, independently of other causes, higher in those countries
where manufactures flourish" [Ricardo, 1817, p. 123]. For a discussion of
Ricardo's contribution to the PPP theory see Officer [1982] and Samuelson
[1984].10
per cent. The undervaluation of the DM in the 1950s and the 1960s took care, of
course, of the original "dollar shortage" and contributed to the accumulation of the
dollar overhang mentioned before (para 15). There is, therefore, no additional item
to be added on this account if we make a historical comparison the basis of our
judgement.
V. Currency Disturbances; The Downfall and Renaissance of the Dollar
26. Historical comparisons with the 1950s and 1960s are valid only to the extent
that the decline and rise of the dollar in the 1970s can be considered an episode
due to exceptional circumstances. Without going into details we may just note:
(a) the financial implications of President Johnson's Great Society Program,
(b) the inflationary financing of the Vietnam War,
(c) the price control experiment of the Nixon Administration,
(d) the overdue breakdown of the Bretton Woods System,
(e) the 1973 oil shock,
(f) Watergate,
(g) the bad luck of the U.S. under the Carter Administration, and
(h) the rise of inflation (to almost 14 per cent) and of inflationary expectations
until late 1979.
27. This period, however, also includes events in the real sector which can be
taken to have led to a reversal of the trend. Worth mentioning are the deregu-
lation of the trucking and airline industries; the creation of millions of new jobs in
response to demographic changes; the emergence of new technology centers which
had hardly any parallel in the rest of the world, perhaps not even in Japan; and
the astonishing fact that real wages declined, partly under the impact of inflation,
partly in response to demographic changes and increasing female participation
rates. Immediately crucial for the dollar exchange rate was, of course, the monet-
ary stance adopted in late 1979 which led to positive and high real rates of
interest, while these rates had been negative when the dollar was at its low.11
28. A country like the U.S. which previously performed a leadership role but loses
ground in this respect to its competitors will suffer a devaluation of its currency
in real terms for the following reasons:
(a) If technological leadership is being lost, the (transitory) monopoly rents from
innovation or from superior quality will disappear: people will have to work harder
to export more to pay for the same volume of imports.
(b) Monetary leadership may be lost in the sense that assets denominated in the
country's currency, including cash, suffer a decline in foreign demand because
foreigners (as well as domestic holders of such assets) lose confidence in the cur-
rency's long-run stability in terms of domestic purchasing power. In order to de-
scribe this case I prefer the metaphor that "portfolios emigrate" or that "the cur-
rency area implodes". Emigration in this sense implies immigration into another
currency area which thus tends to become larger [Giersch, 1977, para 6]. The
"implosion" goes along with a devaluation of the real exchange rate in a process of
currency substitution.
29. If a country - like the U.S. after 1979 - resumes its leadership role in the
field of technology or as a trustworthy supplier of the Western World's inter-
national money, it will experience a sharp upward revaluation of its real exchange
rate. Why then should we be so surprised about the renewed strength of the dol-
lar?
VI. Growth Equilibrium
30. What would real exchange rates look like in a smoothly growing world economy?
A first answer is that they should not be judged by the yardstick of current ac-
count balance because there is a positive role to play for autonomous capital flows
from richer to poorer countries. Wilhelm Ropke once said that people in the upper
floors of the income pyramid tend to devote themselves to capital formation while
the inhabitants of the lower floors take care of population growth. I prefer to use
the metaphor of a Thiinen cone [Giersch, 1949, 1979] for portraying the world
economy or any spatial system with rich centres and poor peripheries. The cone
can grow in a smooth fashion, i.e. with a minimum of structural change, if the12
marginal efficiency of capital tends to rise everywhere at the same rate and if
capital flows from the rich centre where the marginal propensity to save is high
towards the periphery where it is closer to zero. However smooth the growth pro-
cess may be thought of, it must be sustained by the creation and application of
new knowledge, presumably in the centre, to prevent a fall in the profit rate
under the impact of Ricardian constraints (rising rents). But such innovative
growth in the centre goes along with what we call "locational innovations". This
means that the optimum location for producing standardised commodities is moving
from the centre towards the periphery.
31. To bring about this locational shift, the countries closer to the periphery must
make themselves attractive by having their domestic resources "undervalued" via
the exchange rate. Undervaluation in this specific sense means "in terms of costs
for the production of standardised industrial commodities", for brevity's sake
called "Heckscher-Ohlin" goods. The counterpart to this are high and rising rents
and wages for local labour in the centre; they push out the locus of production of
Heckscher-Ohlin goods to the countries closer to the periphery. The structure of
real exchange rates must reflect this structure of cost incentives. If the over-
valuations and the undervaluations (in this sense) are not sufficiently pronounced
the process of locational shift (locational innovations) will be retarded. Retardation
grants excessive time for process innovations to defend the old locations for
Heckscher-Ohlin goods. A reversal of factor insities is then likely to emerge as we
observe it in Thiinen's stationary model in the case of wood as a result of relative-
ly high transportation costs for this commodity. Defensive process innovations are,
of course, also promoted by protectionist policies. Undervaluations and over-
valuations have to be more pronounced if, in addition to transportation costs, such
policy-induced resistances are to be overcome.
32. This spread argument for real exchange rates is a close cousin of the amend-
ment to the PPP discussed in the section about sustained deviations (para 23).
However, there are important differences. In para 23 the reason was the high
price of local commodities in rich countries (say housing rents) which are part of
the PPP basket. Here, it is the price of inputs for Heckscher-Ohlin goods and an
international cost differential needed to induce and support this continuous process
of locational innovations. There, it was a cross-section comparison that would make
sense even if the world economy were in a stationary equilibrium. Here, we have
overvaluation and undervaluation as part and parcel of a moving equilibrium, as13
the incentive system necessary for bringing about the minimum adjustment needed
for a process of trickling down. We may still say that the law of one price holds
for standardised commodities (apart from transportation costs) at any moment- in
time, but then we have to consider that the value of the stock of fixed capital
used in producing these goods goes down in the advanced countries Under the
influence of an exchange rate that people may feel to be overvalued. At the same
time the low valuation of the exchange rates of the less advanced countries raises
the marginal efficiency of capital for the (potential) production of Heckscher-Ohlin
goods in these countries.
33. This model of a smoothly growing world economy offers itself as a reference
system against which important disequilibrium cases can be judged. As to the U.S.
and the dollar we can say so far:
(a) As a rich country the U.S. ought to run an export surplus to support the
outflow of capital to poorer countries. Yet, given the fact that there are poorer
countries which have overborrowed and must regain confidence on world capital
markets by servicing - and perhaps temporarily repaying - their debt, a deficit in
the U.S. current account may help to prevent a debt crisis. Imagine what would
happen if the U.S. now behaved in a similar way as it did in the interwar period
when Germany tried to pay off its reparation debt but failed because the final
recipient - via the inter-allied war debt - did not co-operate by running a current
account deficit.
(b) A high valuation of the dollar may hurt numerous firms producing Heckscher-
Ohlin goods and stimulate protectionist demands in the U.S. Yet this is exactly the
type of competitive pressure which is needed for the relocation of these industries
to less advanced parts of the world economy.
VII. Growth Leadership
34. Countries leading in world economic development must be engines of economic
growth. Those who associate growth with the expansion of demand - implying that
demand is the limiting factor - focus on budget deficits. The "Reagan deficit" is
thus seen as a source of growth.14
35. However, the same observers who support Keynesian remedies for unemploy-
ment and stagnation criticise this deficit for raising the level of interest rates in
the world. Some of them would like Europe and Japan to have higher public defi-
cits instead of the U.S., implying (or not?) that the level of interest rates in the
world would be different in that case (would it really be lower if the world econ-
omy substituted second-rate borrowers for the very best public borrower it pres-
ently has?).
36. Nevertheless, the Reagan deficit deserves criticism, first, if it has to be con-
sidered as an act of dissaving for the world economy as a whole or, second, if it
implies a waste of capital compared to a situation in which total public expenditure
in the U.S. were the same, but the counterpart of the deficit were (additional)
productive investment - say in infrastructure instead of public consumption or re-
armament. As always, the resulting judgement depends upon the reference systems
chosen and the way the alternatives are evaluated.
37. If the Reagan deficit is seen to be the result of the cut in income taxes and
business taxes, one can well argue that this cut is equivalent to a productive
investment to the extent that it helped to improve the incentive system and to
raise the motivation level in society, including the propensity to work, to invest
and to innovate. It is true that our bookkeeping rules do not allow us to consider
this as an investment but in certain circumstances it may be a better form of
investment than an outlay for hardware of the same magnitude. Whether this
interpretation has some value can, however, only be judged in the long run or
perhaps in comparison with Europe where taxes are higher and where motivation
levels appear to be lower.
38. From a European perspective or a vantage point which permits a long-run view
the U.S. can be seen to behave as an engine for world economic growth. Its real
sector seems to have adjusted to the growth conditions of our time much better
than the real sector in large parts of Europe. In order to support this view we
note or recall the following interrelated points.
- While Europe suffers from a level of real wages which is still too high [Giersch,
1978; Artus, forthcoming] and from a rigid wage structure which does not
sufficiently allow for relative scarcities (excessive wages for unskilled workers
and for workers in structurally weak regions, too small wage incentives - after15
taxes and deductions for social security - for attaining qualifications, for
accumulating human capital and for moving to better paid jobs elsewhere, the
U.S. has a balkanised and hence more flexible labour market and a union system
which has become much weaker after the strike of the air controllers and after
the severe 1982 recession. Instead of shortening the working week and reducing
the retirement age, which is on the agenda in Europe, the U.S. has raised the
retirement age and also the number of jobs which support going real wages.
- In Europe profits are still low compared to the interest that can be earned on
financial assets [Dicke, Trapp, 1984]. They fail to respond to the shortage of
productive capital relative to the supply of labour - the combination of capital
shortage and unemployment that emerged in the 1970s [Giersch, 1978]. The U.S.
economy, on the other hand, has succeeded in raising profits to levels which
match the high real rates of interest that exist and are likely to prevail as long
as the structural unemployment (or capital shortage unemployment) calls for
giving capital formation the first priority in the growth process. This is mainly
due to the flexibility of the U.S. labour market.
- In large parts of Europe, including the North of West Germany, people still
believe technology to have a labour-saving bias as one may expect it to have if
real wages are excessively high. Therefore, they adopt an attitude which
amounts ,to opposing technical progress (Europessimism). In the U.S. the
population has never been really affected by such opinion trends and seems to
have almost maintained, or even recently strengthened, its optimism towards the
future course of economic development and technological advance.
- In the U.S. public opinion seems to have recognised that government regulations
and private barriers to entry weaken the economy's capacity to adjust to future
developments. In Europe large sections of society still cling to policy conceptions
and political ideas which are closer to state regulation, corporativism or the
traditional guild society (Eurosclerosis). There may have been some shift to
conservatism on both sides of the Atlantic, but conservatism in Europe essential-
ly means conserving traditional structures rather than the flexibility of society.
39. Taken together, these judgemental propositions (perhaps very subjective ones,
short of further research which appears desperately needed in this field) suggest
that the U.S. is already much better prepared for starting a new spurt in econo-16
mic development, at least in comparison to Europe, perhaps less so in comparison
to Japan. In this perspective, Europe is seen to be in the very early phase of an
adjustment process which is likely to cover more than one of the short-term busi-
ness cycles which we have become accustomed to observe. In the opinion (or the
unspecified socio-economic model) of the present writer the transatlantic time lag in
the real sector's adjustment to faster growth may well lie in the range of five to
ten years. It could be shortened by a concerted movement towards freer trade
among Western countries. Freer international trade would surely help to break up
internal protection in Europe's domestic markets. In that case, the immense
productivity source of international trade and of competition from abroad could be
tapped. This would allow monetary policy to anticipate a somewhat faster growth of
potential output. But the prospects for such a move appear to be dim within the
next couple of years.
VIII. The Short and the Longer View in Contrast
40. The transatlantic time lag in the adjustment to high real rates of interest and
to new technologies supports an explanation for the strength of the dollar and for
the superior performance of the U.S. economy which has its foundations in the
real sector rather than in the monetary-fiscal policy mix. The following statements
may help to bring the two alternative explanations into sharp contrast.
41. If the Reagan deficit is the villain of the piece, capital imports into the U.S.
are of the induced type. They will fade away with the weakening of the present
upswing, so that the dollar declines to correct a current account deficit which
corresponds with the budget deficit. If, however, the high marginal efficiency
(profitability) of investment in the U.S. is the dominant force in the scenario, the
capital flows to the U.S. are more of the autonomous type. They will then decline
only slightly during the next recession, which itself will be weaker if autonomous
investments in the U.S. remain fairly strong. To the extent that the profitability
differential between the U.S. and Europe is decisive and does not substantially
decline, the real exchange rate of the dollar will continue to have strong funda-
mental support.17
42. The short-run explanation suggests that European countries ought to boost
domestic demand by running higher fiscal deficits. They would weaken the induced
flow of investible funds to the U.S. and thus contribute to bringing down the ex-
ternal value of the dollar. The longer-run explanation offered here suggests that
Europe should imitate the U.S. in reducing its real wages, in changing its attitude
towards technical progress and in opening up its markets so that European markets
become more flexible and more attractive to potential entrepreneurs. It is only in
such a process of revitalisation that Europe will regain its former competitiveness
in long-term capital markets. Only then will the fundamentals induce a weakening
of the real exchange rate of the dollar vis-a-vis European currencies, then, how-
ever, in combination with a faster growth of potential and actual output in Europe.
In this longer-run perspective there is no reason to object to potentially higher
budget deficits in Europe, if they do not arise from higher public spending but
from tax cuts that raise the profitability of investment and - by reducing marginal
taxes for wage earners - the motivation level of the labour force and the whole
population.
43. The dominance of the short-run explanation in the public discussion has
drawbacks for a lasting therapy of Europe's economic problems. By making in-
vestors believe that the real value of the dollar will come down quickly, this
explanation discourages U.S. foreign direct investment in Europe. It also makes
European firms pessimistic about the longer run prospects for exporting to the
U.S. market. In the longer run perspective the high dollar is to raise the
profitability (marginal efficiency) of investment in Europe's export sector. This
structure of exchange rates could well transmit part of the driving power for
sustainable growth which the U.S. economy develops to Europe and other count-
ries. However, Europe is unlikely to take advantage of it if the high external
value of the dollar is considered to be a short episode rather than a replay of the
development which Europe experienced in the 1950s and 1960s.
"44. The view that real interest rates will come down rather quickly makes in-
vestors believe that it is not worthwhile to reverse the present bias in investment
and even applied research which favours capital-intensive and labour-saving
technologies in sharp contrast to a situation that displays a shortage of productive
jobs in relation to an abundant supply of labour.18
45. The idea that Europe - and West Germany in particular - needs just a little bit
of fiscal expansion supports populist pressures. This may very well weaken the
efforts to reduce the waste element in public expenditures in order to free re-
sources for productive investment in the private sector which would be the right
response to Europe's capital shortage cum unemployment. Moreover, the concen-
tration on vague macro-economic concepts like deficit spending impairs the chances
for tax cuts designed to promote capital formation and the creation of new firms on
the old continent.
46. Emphasis on short-run measures to boost demand may do less harm in the
U.S., where real wages could be brought down in the 1970s partly under the in-
fluence of unanticipated inflation. But in inflation-experienced Europe with fairly
centralised wage bargaining in many countries the wage problem will have to be
tackled directly. Centralised unions always tend to maintain that unemployment is
not their fault and must, therefore, be due to exogenous factors (like technical
progress) or to a deficiency of overall demand. But although it is effective demand
that matters, i.e. demand in relation to supply prices, they yield to strong mem-
bership pressure for raising real wages when demand improves so that "job
owners" fully benefit from any productivity advance, cyclical or trend-based. It is
true that a learning process has started in Europe, here or there, but it may be
swamped by a policy debate which ignores the micro-economic foundations and
depicts the U.S. policy as the source of the evil. The problem is not only real
wages paid out to the employees but numerous restrictive regulations and practices
which raise the shadow wage for the employers, as they often make the hiring of
new workers an almost irreversible decision. Irreversibility here and a belief in
the reversal of the strengthening of the dollar add up to a situation which is by
far not as encouraging for Europe as the situation was under U.S. growth
leadership in the 1950s and 1960s.
IX. Conclusions
47. If there is to be a brand name for distinguishing this longer view inter-
pretation of the present dollar/DM rate, it may be called a flagship hypothesis. By
raising the marginal efficiency of investment the U.S. economy is speeding up its19
trend rate of growth relative to the laggards in the convoy. The driving power is
autonomous investment rather than induced investment of the accelerator type. The
capital imports into the U.S. which compensate for the crowding-out effect of the
Reagan deficit are, therefore, more trend-based than cyclical. They raise the ex-
ternal value of the dollar and thus weaken the competitive position of the less
productive parts of U.S. manufacturing to the benefit of locations in countries
with lower labour costs. Some of the laggards have to transfer debt services;
others see the marginal efficiency of investment in their export sector improved,
but have difficulty in making full use of this imparted and imported driving force.
This speeding up of the pacemaker and this lagging of the followers is a plausible
explanation for the transatlantic tensions in the field of economic policy.
48. At the end of a tiring series of reflections an applied economist must try to
arrive at a hard conclusion. To make it short: the author would be more than
mildly surprised if the real exchange rate of the dollar vis-a-vis the DM during
the next three years dropped by more than the 10 or 15 per cent mentioned above
on the average during any period of twelve months (1). This rests on the (re-
alistic) condition that the U.S. is remaining on a monetary path which does not
give rise to inflationary expectations (as it did in the second half of the 1970s).
Moreover, the flagship hypothesis suggests that the range for the fluctuations of
the dollar might even have a somewhat higher floor. In subsequent years Europe
may well succeed in lowering this floor just as the world may succeed in bringing
down the real rate of interest by accelerating capital formation and economising on
the use of capital. But such success on the exchange rate front will largely de-
pend upon how far the old continent regains strength in curing Eurosclerosis.
(1) When this paper was drafted towards the end of July 1984, the exchange rate
was approximately 2,85 DM/dollar.20
References
ARTUS, Jacques R., An Empirical Evaluation of the Disequilibrium Real Wage Rate
Hypothesis, forthcoming.
BALASSA, Bela, "The Purchasing-Power Parity Doctrine: A Reappraisal". The
Journal of Political Economy, Vol. 72, 1964, pp. 584-596.
BERGSTEN, C. Fred, The International Implications of Reaganomics. Kieler Vor-
trage, N.S., 96, Tubingen 1982.
BLANCHARD, Olivier, Rudiger DORNBUSCH, "U.S. Deficits, the Dollar and Eu-
rope". Banca Nazionale del Lavoro Quarterly Review, No. 148, 1984, pp. 89-
113.
DICKE, Hugo, Peter TRAPP, Zinsen, Gewinne und Nettoinvestitionen. Zu den Be-
stimmungsfaktoren der Sachvermogensbildung westdeutscher Unternehmen. In-
stitut fur Weltwirtschaft, Kiel Discussion Papers, 99, June 1984.
GIERSCH, Herbert, "Economic Union Between Nations and the Location of Indus-
tries". The Review of Economic Studies, Vol. 17, 1949, pp. 87-97.
—, "Entrepreneurial Risk under Flexible Exchange Rates". Approaches to Greater
Flexibility of Exchange Rates. The Biirgenstock Papers. Princeton/N.J. 1970,
pp. 145-149.
—, "IMF Surveillance Over Exchange Rates". In: Robert MUNDELL, Jacques J.
POLAK (Eds.), The New International Monetary System. New York 1977, pp.
51-108.
—, "Preface". In: Herbert GIERSCH (Ed.), Capital Shortage and Unemployment in
the World Economy. Symposium 1977. Tubingen 1978, pp. V-XII.
—, "Aspects of Growth, Structural Change, and Employment. A Schumpeterian
Perspective". Weltwirtschaftliches Archiv, Vol. 115, 1979, pp. 629-652.
HARROD, Roy F., International Economics, London, Cambridge 1933.
MARRIS, Stephen, The Dollar Problem. Statement on H.J. Res. 585, before the
U.S. House of Representatives, Committee on Banking and Urban Affairs, Sub-
committee on Domestic Monetary Policy, August 9, 1984. Revised Ed. August
17, 1984.
MASCARO, Angelo, Allan H. MELTZER, "Long- and Short-Term Interest Rates in a
Risky World". Journal of Monetary Economics, Vol. 12, No. 4, 1983, pp. 485-
518.
OFFICER, Lawrence H., Purchasing Power Parity and Exchange Rates. London
1982.
RICARDO, David, Principles of Political Economy and Taxation, 1817. Edited by E.
C. K. GONNER, London 1927.20
References
ARTUS, Jacques R., An Empirical Evaluation of the Disequilibrium Real Wage Rate
Hypothesis, forthcoming.
BALASSA, Bela, "The Purchasing-Power Parity Doctrine: A Reappraisal". The
Journal of Political Economy, Vol. 72, 1964, pp. 584-596.
BERGSTEN, C. Fred, The International Implications of Reaganomics. Kieler Vor-
trage, N.S., 96, Tubingen 1982.
BLANCHARD, Olivier, Rudiger DORNBUSCH, "U.S. Deficits, the Dollar and Eu-
rope". Banca Nazionale del Lavoro Quarterly Review, No. 148, 1984, pp. 89-
113.
DICKE, Hugo, Peter TRAPP, Zinsen, Gewinne und Nettoinvestitionen. Zu den Be-
stimmungsfaktoren der Sachvermogensbildung westdeutscher Unternehmen. In-
stitut fur Weltwirtschaft, Kiel Discussion Papers, 99, June 1984.
GIERSCH, Herbert, "Economic Union Between Nations and the Location of Indus-
tries". The Review of Economic Studies, Vol. 17, 1949, pp. 87-97.
—, "Entrepreneurial Risk under Flexible Exchange Rates". Approaches to Greater
Flexibility of Exchange Rates. The Biirgenstock Papers. Princeton/N.J. 1970,
pp. 145-149.
—, "IMF Surveillance Over Exchange Rates". In: Robert MUNDELL, Jacques J.
POLAK (Eds.), The New International Monetary System. New York 1977, pp.
51-108.
—, "Preface". In: Herbert GIERSCH (Ed.), Capital Shortage and Unemployment in
the World Economy. Symposium 1977. Tubingen 1978, pp. V-XII.
—, "Aspects of Growth, Structural Change, and Employment. A Schumpeterian
Perspective". Weltwirtschaftliches Archiv, Vol. 115, 1979, pp. 629-652.
HARROD, Roy F., International Economics, London, Cambridge 1933.
MARRIS, Stephen, The Dollar Problem. Statement on H.J. Res. 585, before the
U.S. House of Representatives, Committee on Banking and Urban Affairs, Sub-
committee on Domestic Monetary Policy, August 9, 1984. Revised Ed. August
17, 1984.
MASCARO, Angelo, Allan H. MELTZER, "Long- and Short-Term Interest Rates in a
Risky World". Journal of Monetary Economics, Vol. 12, No. 4, 1983, pp. 485-
518.
OFFICER, Lawrence H., Purchasing Power Parity and Exchange Rates. London
1982.
RICARDO, David, Principles of Political Economy and Taxation, 1817. Edited by E.
C. K. GONNER, London 1927.21
SACHVERSTANDIGENRAT zur Begutachtung der gesamtwirtschaftlichen Entwick-
lung, Jahresgutachten 1964. Deutscher Bundestag, Drucksache IV/2890, Par.
33-42.
SAMUELSON, Paul A., "Second Thoughts on Analytical Income Comparisons". The
Economic Journal, Vol. 94, 1984, pp. 267-278.